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This study demonstrates how naturalistic decision-making (NDM) can be usefully applied 
to study ‘decision inertia’ – Namely the cognitive process associated with failures to 
execute action when a decision-maker struggles to choose between equally perceived 
aversive outcomes.  Data assessed the response  and recovery from a sudden impact 
disaster during a 2-day immersive simulated emergency response.  Fourteen agencies 
(including police, fire, ambulance, and military) and 194 participants were involved in the 
exercise. By assessing  the frequency, type, audience, and content of communications, and 
by reference to five subject matter experts’ slow time analyses of critical turning points 
during the incident, three barriers were identified as reducing multiagency information 
sharing and the  macrocognitive understanding  of the  incident. When  the  decision 
problem  was  non-time-bounded,  involved multiple agencies, and  identification of 
superordinate  goals was lacking, the communication between agencies decreased  and 
agencies focused on within-agency information sharing. These barriers distracted teams 
from timely and efficient discussions on decisions and action execution with seeking 
redundant  information, which resulted in decision inertia. Our  study illustrates how 
naturalistic environments are conducive to examining relatively understudied concepts of 
decision inertia, failures to  act, and shared  situational macrocognition in situations 
involving large distributed teams. 
 
 
 
Practitioner points 
   Researchers can use NDM to explore the cognitive processing associated with failures to act/decision 
inertia. 
   Complexities in the decision-making environment of a multiteam system (e.g., non-time-bounded 
choice, large team size, and lack of strategic goals) are associated with decision-making failures. 
   Barriers cause decision inertia as teams focus on redundant intra-agency information seeking rather 
than cooperative interagency communications. 
   Strategic direction is especially important  for shifting multiteam system communication towards 
interagency discussions on action execution. 
 
If the  behavioural  implementation of making  a decision  is the  execution of action 
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001; Yates, 2003), then failing to make a decision (e.g., 
making an executive  choice) is when action execution fails. Traditional decision-making 
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research  has helped  psychologists  to understand the conditions  under which decisions 
are likely to be actioned in a static, closed environment, where decision-makers have the 
opportunity to analyse the choice  context and select an optimal course  of action (e.g., 
expected utility theory;  Von Neumann  & Morgenstern,  1947). Yet in the ‘real world’, 
decision-makers rarely have the luxury of having unambiguous information or sufficient 
time  to analyse choices,  and  thus,  their  rationality  is bound  by cognitive  constraints 
(Simon, 1956). Whilst early research treated bounded rationality as maladaptive in causing 
cognitive biases and faulty heuristic processing (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), ‘naturalistic 
decision-making’ (NDM) takes a more pragmatic perspective. 
 
 
The NDM paradigm 
NDM rejects the notion of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ decisions and instead seeks to understand the 
cognitive processes associated with choice implementation by studying decision-making 
‘in the wild’ (Gore, Banks, Millward, & Kyraikidou, 2006; McAndrew & Gore, 2013). NDM 
emphasizes the importance of real-world contexts, domain-specific expertise, and 
macrocognition in distributed and sociotechnical teams (Stanton, Wong, Gore, Sevdalis, & 
Strub, 2011). The aim of NDM is ‘to understand how people make decisions in real-world 
contexts  that  are meaningful  and  familiar to them’  (Lipshitz et al.,  2001,  p.  332).  It 
juxtaposes earlier decision-making research that aimed to explore decision-making errors 
(Kahneman  & Tversky, 1979) and instead takes a positive approach by focusing on the 
processes that enable individuals to make decisions (Gore et al., 2006). This is why NDM 
research is often grounded in the notion of ‘expertise’ as researchers seek to uncover the 
declarative knowledge  that is implicitly stored in the cognition of experts  (Klein, 1997). 
Expert ‘macrocognition’  goes beyond  behavioural  decision-making and encompasses a 
number  of key cognitive elements  that distinguish  the expert  from the novice, which 
include  mental  models,  perceptual skills, sense  of typicality, routines,  and declarative 
knowledge  (Klein & Militello, 2004). 
In addition  to  furthering  interest  in positivist  research,  NDM has  also developed 
naturalistic methods for data collection. For example, ‘cognitive task analysis’ is uniquely 
designed   to  unpack   macrocognition  and  includes   various,  and  largely  qualitative, 
techniques such as the ‘critical decision method’ interview protocol (for more detail, see 
Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006). An overreliance  on ecologically invalid laboratory- 
based  settings  is inappropriate (Schneider  & Shanteau,  2003)  as  the  real  world  is 
characterized by ill-structured  problems,  uncertainty, poorly  defined  goals, multiple 
feedback  loops,  time  constraints, high stakes,  multiple  players,  and conflict  between 
personal ideals and contextual requirements (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). Thus, this is the 
setting in which research should be conducted. Lipshitz (1993) recognized that although 
no unified NDM theory  exists, they all have a common  set of assumptions:  Cognitive 
processing  in the  real world  varies, situation  assessment  is critical, mental  imagery is 
important, the decision-making context must be specified, decision-making is dynamic, 
and research  should focus on how decision-makers  actually function  rather  than how 
they ought  to function. 
An unparalleled  advantage  of NDM is the  active encouragement for researchers to 
remain flexible and open  minded when  exploring  large and naturalistic  data sets. This 
facilitates the discovery of novel or previously missed psychological phenomena through 
coincidental  observations. For example, the notion of expertise  and ‘recognition-primed 
decision-making’ was a product of NDM research  (Klein, 1997). A series of cognitive 
interviews conducted with expert firefighters revealed how skilled decision-makers were
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able to rapidly select a course of action by ‘pattern matching’ between the environment 
and the available responses they had cognitively stored. Crucially, Klein (2008) found that 
experts  tend not to compare  options to find the best response  but instead evaluate each 
option in singular succession until they find one that is good enough. These conclusions 
on expert cognition have since been replicated in a wide range of domains and have had a 
significant  impact  on the  understanding of expertise. For example,  Jenkins, Stanton, 
Salmon, Walker, and Rafferty (2010) found that experts  will ‘leap’ or ‘shunt’ between 
decision stages to facilitate rapid and intuitive action, whereas novice decision-makers are 
more analytical and linear in their decision-making.  Experts  are also able to ‘reflect in 
action’ during the decision-making process  to reduce  situation  uncertainty and ensure 
that  their  actions   remain  consistent  with  the  changing   environment  (Cristancho, 
Vanstone, Lingard, LeBel, & Ott, 2013; Scho€n, 1987; van den Heuvel, Alison, & Power, 
2014). 
Taking the above into account,  the topic of interest  for the current  study was also a 
product of naturalistic  observations.  The authors,  after having used NDM to research 
critical incident  decision-making in the domain of emergency  service workers  for over 
15 years,  noticed   that  when   faced  with  a  challenging  decision,  even  experienced 
decision-makers often fail to take any action at all. In other words, they appeared to rely 
on a cognitive  heuristic  that  suggests when  the  solution  to a problem  is unclear,  the 
safest option  is to do nothing.  Rather than commit to a choice,  they actively (and with 
considerable  cognitive  effort)  try  and  delay  the  implementation  of  a  choice  (Eyre, 
Alison, Crego, & McLean, 2008; van den Heuvel, Alison, & Crego, 2012). This is distinct 
from decision  avoidance (Anderson,  2003) where  decision-makers  refuse to evaluate 
choice  through  passive  inaction  (e.g.,  ‘I choose  not  to  decide  for the  time  being’). 
Instead, we have observed how decision-makers fail to act through  ‘decision inertia’, the 
cognitively active  and redundant deliberation  of choice  despite  there  being a low (or 
no) chance  of discovering  any new information  to inform the decision (e.g., ‘I am still 
thinking about whether I will commit to, refuse or avoid this choice’). This is important 
in dynamic crisis environments where  often the ‘most-worst’ outcome  is the failure to 
act as ‘more is missed by not doing than not knowing’ (Byrnes, 2011, p. 28). If a decision 
is optimal, then the team can perform well; if the decision is non-optimal, then the team 
can re-evaluate, revise, and respond,  yet if the decision is not made, then the team drifts 
along a trajectory  of uncertainty, inaction,  and inertia. Not only will this study provide 
an in-depth analysis of this novel approach to failures to act, but we will also highlight 
how engagement with the NDM paradigm provided  a contextualized, meaningful, and 
applicable  methodology  to research  and  discover  the  cognitive  processes  associated 
with inaction. 
 
 
Using NDM to research macrocognition in a multiagency emergency  team  responding 
to a simulated sudden impact  major disaster 
Emergency  service workers  must  operate  in highly dynamic,  uncertain, and complex 
decision-making  environments where  interoperable team  coordination is essential  to 
facilitate action (House, Power, & Alison, 2014). These decision-making environments are 
highly unstable,  rapid-changing,  and unpredictable (van den Heuvel et al., 2014), and 
thus,  effective  team  processing  requires  that  ‘members’  interdependent acts convert 
inputs to outcomes through cognitive, verbal, and behavioural activities directed towards 
organizing task work to achieve collective goals’ (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001, p. 
357). To clarify, macrocognition is the study of ‘how teams move between internalisation
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and externalisation of cognition to build knowledge in service of problem solving’ (Fiore 
et al., 2010, p. 203). It considers both social and technical  influences on team cognition 
during the decision process  (Schubert,  Denmark, Crandall, Grome, & Pappas, 2012) to 
increase understanding of collective group cognition during sense making (Stanton et al., 
2011).  Teams are not  only made up of a collection  of individuals, but  also consist  of 
‘subteams’ (or ‘agencies’). In multiteam systems, individuals will share and utilize 
information to assist both individual (intra-agency) decision-making goals and more 
strategic joint (interagency) decisions and actions (Ancona & Chong, 1996). They need to 
shift  attention   between  within-group,   intrateam  processing,   and   between-group, 
interteam coordination (Marks et al., 2001). For example,  police officers operate  with 
their ‘intra-agency’ police colleagues along with their ‘interagency’ emergency response 
colleagues (e.g., fire and ambulance  services), who have both cohesive and conflicting 
goals depending on the incident  and required outcome. 
Teams struggle to make decisions due to poor communication, inconsistent situation 
awareness,  and conflict of interests (Chen, Sharman, Rao, & Upadhyaya, 2008). Rusman, 
van Bruggen, Sloep, and Koper (2010) examined  virtually distributed  teams and found 
that ‘trust’ between team members was based upon judgements of communality, ability, 
benevolence, internalized  norms,  and  accountability.   Not  only  does  this  show  the 
importance of placing objective trust in another’s ability during teamwork (Mayer, Davis, 
& Schoorman,  1995),  but  it also highlights  the  importance of subjective  ratings  of 
benevolence, norms, and communality that will be derived from past experience with one 
another.  Keyton and Beck (2010) highlighted  how the type and meaning of communi- 
cations in teams is based upon  an ever-evolving context derived from past interactions 
within  the  team.  Past experiences of operating  within  a specific  team  influences  an 
individual’s understanding of their role and team culture  (Bearman, Paletz, Orasanu, & 
Thomas, 2010) which can influence their decision-making behaviour at both an individual 
and collective levels (Marks et al., 2001). Thus, research  needs to be sensitive to social 
dynamics and embrace subjective and personal experiences. NDM methods are ideal for 
enabling a deeper  exploration of both intra- and intergroup processing at both cognitive 
and socially constructed levels. 
 
 
Exploring how time pressure,  team  size, and strategic direction interact with 
decision-making in emergency  service decision-making teams 
Emergency incident  contexts provide a unique domain in which to apply NDM to study 
multiteam  systems,  cognitive  processing,  and  failures to act.  Over the  last decade,  a 
considerable number of natural and man-made major emergencies  have occurred, which 
include  flooding, tsunamis,  nuclear  accidents,  and toxic chemical  spills. The effects of 
these  emergency  incidents  are  widespread, affecting  a large  population, disrupting 
infrastructure, and incurring huge costs (emotional, physical, and commercial) in both the 
short and long term.  Although society recovers,  post-incident  criticisms of such major 
disasters often suggest that there was inadequate pre-planning  and delayed responding. 
For example,  Japan’s Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation  Commission empha- 
sized how delays in taking action contributed to the inappropriate response that occurred 
during the Fukushima nuclear disaster, which lead to confusing and conflicting messages 
at both a response  and civilian level (Kurokawa, 2012). As a result, the magnitude of the 
initial damage was greater, and the amount of time taken to recover was longer, due to the 
inherent  ambiguity and complexity  associated  with  the challenging  environment (van 
den Heuvel et al., 2014).
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We  selected   three  barriers  that,  with  reference   to  the  literature   and  anecdotal 
evidence,  were  anticipated to reduce  action  implementation and  instead  cause  time- 
delayed inertia decision-making processes.  We predicted that interagency  communica- 
tions would decrease when choices were non-time-bounded, involved multiple agencies, 
and lacked clear strategic direction. These ‘barriers’ were relevant to the decision-making 
context of emergency  incidents  as they typically involve multiteam  systems who often 
hold competing goals and must  operate  under  variable time pressures.  Although it is 
recognized that conducting NDM research at simulated training events offers the potential 
to explore a vast array of other variables (e.g., expertise, decision strategies, behavioural 
patterns), we chose to focus on three specific barriers in order to reduce and control the 
data set, and to aid our understanding of the cognitive and social processes associated with 
failures to act. 
 
 
Time-bounded choice 
A choice can be either time pressured to meet a deadline or non-time-bounded and thus 
amenable  to deliberation. When an individual is exposed  to time-pressured deadlines, 
they  will try and  adapt  to time  constraints  by reducing  their  generation  of potential 
options   (Alison,  Doran,  Long,  Power,  &  Humphrey,   2013).  Time  pressure   makes 
individuals  more  risk-seeking and  increases the  likelihood  of choice  implementation 
(Young, Goodie, Hall, & Wu, 2012), but this does not always lead to increased  decision 
accuracy.  NDM research  has described  how  skilled decision-makers  can adapt  well to 
time  pressure  using efficient  and  intuitive  pattern  matching  (Alison, van den  Heuvel 
et al., 2013; Klein, 1997),  whereas  less skilled decision-makers  will utilize faulty and 
biased cognitive  and heuristic  shortcuts  to speed  up  and bypass the  decision-making 
process (Ask & Granhag, 2007). Yet there has been relatively little research  on how the 
absence   of  time   pressure   influences   choice,   specifically  with   regard   to  how   it 
influences  the  likelihood  and timeliness  of action  execution. This may be due  to the 
traditional  use  of experimental paradigms  whereby  choices  are  made  salient  to  the 
decision-maker in order to prompt a response, thereby artificially inducing a pressure  to 
respond. 
When a decision is not constrained to deadlines, this means that decision-makers have 
the opportunity to avoid or redundantly  deliberate  on their choice. When decisions are 
perceived to be difficult, then individuals will try to avoid committing to a course of action 
(van den Heuvel et al., 2012) in order to avoid anticipated negative consequences such as 
negative emotions (Anderson, 2003), and when operating within organizational settings, 
the  potential  for criticism  is due  to  accountability  (Waring,  Alison, Cunningham,  & 
Whitfield, 2013). When someone  expects to receive feedback on their actions in team- 
based settings, they will tend to avoid choice (Zeelenberg  & van Dijk, 1997) due to the 
potential for anticipated loss (Crotty & Thompson, 2009), the anticipation of blame (Eyre 
et al., 2008), or the perceived inability to personally justify their choice (Brooks, 2011). A 
lack of deadlines means that individuals are more likely to use deliberative and alternative- 
based  processing   of choice  to  establish  whether any  of their  available options  are 
available/acceptable (Parker & Schrift, 2011), in place of more time-efficient cognitive 
search  strategies,  such  as satisficing  (Simon, 1956),  which  establishes  which  of the 
available options  is the ‘least worst’ or ‘acceptable’. Thus, a complex  decision problem 
that is ‘non-time-bounded’ has high potential  for inertia, and we predicted that this will 
principally   manifest   through   reduced   action   execution  and   increased   redundant 
deliberation  over already established intra-agency information.
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Team size 
Communication and coordination are essential for facilitating a team’s macrocognitive 
functioning  (Keyton & Beck, 2010). We hypothesized that as the number  of responding 
agencies involved in the decision task increased,  the ability to coordinate  action would 
diminish.  This is because  although  ‘interdependent’ tasks require  the  coordination of 
information and resources from multiple players (van de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976), 
the increase  in the number  of people  involved makes the decision  environment more 
complex  (LePine, Piccolo,  Jackson, Mathieu, & Saul, 2008).  Team decision-making  is 
facilitated by shared mental models, where  all players hold a common  understanding of 
the situation  and associated actions (Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001). The key 
macrocognitive  function  of a multiteam  system  is to reduce  uncertainty and  risk by 
establishing and maintaining common ground and shared mental models (Schubert et al., 
2012). In multiteam systems, shared mental models not only inform how players should 
coordinate  within  their own  team but also help a collective  awareness  of interagency 
goals and actions (Mathieu et al., 2001). Multiteam systems must monitor both inter- and 
intrateam   processes   to  provide  relevant  feedback  and  instruction  to  one  another 
(Dickinson & McIntyre, 1997). Team monitoring  and coordination behaviours  that help 
facilitate action should occur continually to ensure  that actions within the multiagency 
network  are consistent (Brannick, Prince, Prince, & Salas, 1992; Marks et al., 2001). 
Establishing a shared mental model is more difficult in large teams. Being a member of a 
large team reduces  an individual’s psychological  ‘ownership’  of a problem  as responsi- 
bility is diffused throughout the  wider  team network  (Kroon,  ’t Hart, & van Kreveld, 
1991).  An individual’s sense  of ownership of a problem  influences  how  personally 
responsible they feel for the potential consequences of a choice (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 
2001). Holding someone  individually accountable for collective outcomes  makes them 
work  harder  at a team  level (Kroon et al., 1991), and thus,  psychological  ownership 
facilitates team work. In large teams, individuals have less ‘ownership’, feel less 
accountable, and thus reduce  their efforts as lines of communication become  exponen- 
tially larger rather  than  additive (Kroon  et al., 1991). When support from other  team 
members  is lacking, individuals are less likely to process  decision tasks at an individual 
level  (Mueller,  2012).  In  addition,  when   operating   in  hierarchical   teams  involving 
command  structures (such as the emergency  services), these process  losses associated 
with increased team size are often underestimated by those in charge (Staats, Milkman, & 
Fox, 2012). This could induce  erroneous expectations of decision-making  capabilities 
from those higher up the decision-making command  chain. Therefore, we hypothesized 
that  as team  size increased,  the  likelihood  of action  would  reduce  due  to associated 
reductions in psychological ownership of the decision problem, feelings of responsibility, 
and diluted communications. 
 
 
Superordinate goals 
‘Superordinate  (strategic)  goals’ help  guide decision-makers  to generate  and  evaluate 
different   courses   of  action   (Cannon-Bowers,   Tannenbaum,  Salas, &  Volpe,  1995; 
Dickinson  & McIntyre, 1997).  They are ‘goals that  are urgent  and  compelling  for all 
groups involved but whose attainment requires the resources and efforts of more than one 
group’ (Sherif, 1962, p. 19). Strategic direction helps to guide the planning of actions to 
achieve goals. It can facilitate deliberate planning, wherein principal courses of action for 
mission accomplishment are formulated, contingency planning, where alternative plans 
are developed to adapt to any anticipated potential events, and reactive planning which is
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in response to unanticipated changes during the incident  (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; 
Marks et al.,  2001).  In  multiteam  systems,  common  goals  are  critical  for  interteam 
cooperation as it transforms  individual units into a powerful  collective (Katzenbach  & 
Smith, 1993). Individuals often hold competing individual and team-based goals that can 
make  decision-making  difficult  (Wittenbaum,  Hollingshead,  & Botero,  2004).  Clear 
strategic  direction  can  reduce  cognitive  conflict  by placing  boundaries  on  decision- 
making and making collective aims salient. The setting of superordinate goals can also 
help teams to adopt a collective identity, which can reduce the potential for diluted efforts 
as a product of large teams  and  facilitate  intergroup cooperation (Driskell, Salas, & 
Johnston, 1999). 
To establish  and reach  common  strategic  goals, a team  must  exchange reciprocal 
information   across  the  network.   Individuals  need  to  understand  the  network   as  a 
whole  in terms  of available resources  and expertise, and also be made  aware  of any 
potential   constraints   in  the  decision  environment  (Stout,  Cannon-Bowers,  Salas, & 
Milanovich, 1999). Effective macrocognition in teams is thus  dependent upon  ‘action 
processes’,  the acts taken by members  that contribute directly to goal accomplishment 
(Marks et al.,  2001)  and  help  synchronize   both  individual  and  collective  activities 
within  complex,  dynamic, and unpredictable environments (Tesluk, Mathieu, Zaccaro, 
& Marks, 1997).  Action processes  help  with  sense  making  across  the  team  network 
(Alberts & Hayes, 2006)  as they  involve team  monitoring  and the  implementation of 
synchronized  and  coordinated actions  (Marks et al.,  2001).  In addition,  the  commu- 
nication of strategic direction  must be communicated with explicit meaning and intent 
across the  multiteam  network  to achieve  a shared  awareness  (Beck & Keyton,  2009; 
Keyton & Beck, 2010). Taking the above into account,  we predicted that a lack of clear 
strategic  direction  would  reduce  the ability to coordinate and communicate decisions 
and actions. 
 
 
Method 
Data were collected  from a large-scale multiagency  (n = 14 agencies) simulation-based 
training exercise of an aeroplane  crash over a major city. It explored  the macrocognitive 
processing  of a multiagency,  emergency  response  team  who  would  be  expected to 
respond  to this type  of incident.  The training  event  was conducted using the  ‘hydra’ 
system, an immersive simulated learning platform that can assist organizational training 
whilst facilitating research. As discussed at length by Alison, van den Heuvel et al. (2013), 
simulations provide a useful platform for studying decision-making in multiteam systems 
(such as the emergency  services) as they provide vast amounts of varied data to explore 
the social, organizational, cultural, and political factors that are inherent  in such 
organizational  environments, whilst  importantly  facilitating  their  primary  purpose in 
training decision-makers  by exposing  them to challenging  incidents.  Hydra replicates  a 
traditional ‘tabletop’ simulation exercise by placing trainees (or participants) into small 
teams split across separate ‘syndicate rooms’. Those who are running the exercise, in our 
case a mixture of trainers and researchers, control the simulation from the central ‘control 
room’ by feeding relevant  information  into each syndicate  room. As with a traditional 
tabletop  exercise,  participants are  split  into  teams  and  placed  into  syndicate  rooms 
according to the purpose of the simulation. Each syndicate room is equipped with a laptop 
computer, a large TV screen to project the computer image, a printer, and a video/sound 
recorder.
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During  the  exercise,  syndicate  rooms  are  fed  information.  Information  feeds  or 
‘injects’ may include videos, audio clips, paper print out messages, or even role players. 
Syndicate  rooms  can  also  request   and  receive  additional  information   through   the 
‘communicator’,  a chat box that links each syndicate room to the central control room. 
Facilitators in the control room can respond  to information requests from each syndicate 
room through this system, monitor decision logs, and pass information between syndicate 
rooms at the request  of participants. This allows simulations  to be fluid, dynamic, and 
responsive to the actions of the participants in the syndicate rooms, enabling an in-depth 
analysis of immersive and NDM whilst maintaining a level of experimental control. 
 
 
Participants 
Participants  (n = 194) took part in a two-day simulated exercise  of an aeroplane  crash 
over a major city. Participants  came  from 14 different  agencies,  including  the  police 
(n = 20), fire (n = 10), ambulance  (n = 8), military (n = 3), local authority  (n = 12), 
government offices (n = 15), media  (n = 19), health  services  (n = 15), environment 
agency (n = 6), utilities (n = 6), science  and technical  advice (n = 13), and transport 
(n = 31),  along  with   a  multiagency   gold  group   (n = 36).  All  participants  were 
experienced real-life responders who could be required  to respond  to a real-life major 
incident  of this nature  (London Emergency Services Liaison Panel, 2007). They were  a 
mixture of strategic (‘gold’) decision-makers (who were placed in one syndicate room and 
were  tasked with making strategic  decisions  about  the incident)  and tactical decision- 
makers  from each  agency  (who  were  split into  separate  syndicate  rooms  during  the 
exercise,  one for each agency team). 
In addition to the participants in the syndicate rooms, 10 trainers and 19 subject matter 
advisors  were  located  in  the  control  room.  Advisors were  experienced emergency 
responders from the local resilience forum who helped design the scenario and were able 
to respond to agency-specific information requests. The exercise control team was 
responsible for feeding  information  feeds to each  syndicate  room  and  responding to 
communicator messages. 
 
 
Procedure 
Strategic ‘gold’ commanders from each agency were placed into one syndicate room, and 
supporting staff from each  agency were  split into  separate  agency-specific ‘syndicate 
rooms’ (Figure 1). This set-up was designed  to replicate  the  command  structure that 
would  be in operation  during  a real-life major incident  in the  United Kingdom. Each 
syndicate room received information that reflected what they would receive in a real-life 
event. For example, support  staff in the ambulance syndicate room received information 
regarding casualties, whereas the police support staff received information on cordoning 
and evacuation  procedures. Agencies communicated to one another  by sending logged 
messages  through  the  communicator (via the  control  room).  They were  also able to 
communicate with other members of their own agency not in the syndicate room (e.g., 
those  from their  agency on the  simulated  incident  ground)  also via a message  to the 
control room. 
The training event took place over 2 days. Day one of the training event simulated the 
multiagency   ‘response’  phase,  which   ran  in  real  time  from  8 AM  until  10 PM  and 
represented two simulated days (e.g., ‘day 1 response’ and ‘day 2 response’). The second 
exercise day simulated the multiagency ‘recovery’ phase, which ran in real time from 8 AM
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Figure 1. A typical syndicate room used during a ‘Hydra’ simulation. 
 
 
until 12 midday and simulated  the  transition  to ‘day 3 recovery’ (London Emergency 
Services  Liaison Panel,  2007).  During  the  simulation,  participants  within   separate 
syndicate rooms were responsible  for sharing and coordinating  the information they had 
received to relevant internal and external bodies through  the communicator. 
 
 
The scenario: Aeroplane  collision over a major city 
A general  timeline  was followed  by the  exercise  control  room.  The control  team  fed 
information  about  the  overall  unfolding  scenario  to  all agencies;  however,   specific 
timelines  and  information  feeds were  adapted  during  the  simulation  based  upon  the 
learning requirements of the exercise  and recommendations from advisors. The initial 
information feed (that went to all agencies) stated that two aeroplanes had crashed above 
a local city airport: One crashed into a residential tower and the other crashed into a power 
station  (causing  a large section  of the  city to lose power).  Subsequent  feeds involved 
updates  on traffic congestion,  the failure of specific metro  lines, information  on toxic 
plumes  and reduced  air quality over large and populated areas of the city, updates  on 
number of victims and casualties involved, and information regarding hospital generators 
failing and running out of fuel. Agency-specific information feeds involved, for example, 
an intelligence update that terrorism could not be ruled out (police) and that the number 
of available resources  were being stretched due to the severity of the incident  (fire and 
ambulance). 
 
 
Data collection 
Data were collated from the electronic communication logs that were passed between the 
syndicates and control room. Participants used communication logs to request additional 
information about the incident from their own or other responding  agencies and also to 
provide  information   when   requested.  They  used  the  communicator  to  coordinate 
decisions and actions and request  information from their own agency (e.g., advisors) or 
other  agencies.  Participants  marked  their  communications as follows: (1) information 
seeking,  (2) a decision,  or (3) an action.  Communications were  coded  according  to
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whether they were ‘intra-agency’ (e.g., fire requesting confirmation of available resources 
from control) or ‘interagency’ (e.g., police coordinating triage locations with ambulance). 
Communications  were   coded   as  intra-  or  interagency   only  when   they  explicitly 
mentioned either their own or another  agency. Note that ‘intra-agency’ communications 
does not  refer to verbal communications made within  syndicate  rooms, but relates to 
messages concerning their agency that were sent to the control room. 
 
 
Data analysis 
Social network analysis 
Social network  analysis (SNA) usefully provides  an overarching  picture  of the  social 
dynamics of team-based settings and can further be used to focus qualitative analysis. We 
conducted a SNA of the  communication logs to  produce an  overview  of the  social 
interaction and relationships  between the  different  agencies  involved in the  exercise 
(Knoke & Yang, 2008). Relational SNA shows how central a group is within the network, 
where they are positioned  within the network  (which is defined by their relationship  or 
ties to all others), and how dense the ties are between the groups or people that make up 
that network  (Mizruchi, 1994). 
The initial step in analysis involved inputting frequency data into the network analysis 
package,   UCINET (Borgatti,  Everett,  &  Freeman,   1992).   To  analyse  the   density, 
centralization,  and hierarchy of the social network, two communication matrices were 
produced: One  that  reflected  the  presence or  absence  of communication between 
agencies, and another to indicate the total sum of messages between agencies (Table 1). 
These matrices coded communications across the entire incident,  as well as specifically 
within  the  ‘response’  (e.g., days 1 and  2) and  ‘recovery’ (e.g.,  day 3) phases  of the 
simulation. In addition, a multidimensional-scale  technique was used to create  a visual 
representation of networked communications for both the response and recovery phases 
(Figures 2 and 3). This visual representation involves plotting all agencies relative to one 
another  so that their position  within  the space  reflects how  strongly they are socially 
connected to others. Agencies that are closely located have more relative association with 
each other and represent the key members of that network, whilst agencies on the fringes 
or periphery  of the network  are those agencies who communicated less with all others 
(Heinz & Manikas, 1992). 
 
 
Identifying the ‘critical issues’ that required interagency communication 
One of the  challenges  of NDM research  is establishing  how  to judge decision-making 
quality  (Gore   et al.,   2006).   The   SNA provided   top-level  frequency   findings  on 
communications between agencies, but this does not provide us with information about 
communication quality. For example,  some decisions  may require  more  internal  than 
external  collaboration  and thus decentralized networks  may counter-intuitively  reflect 
better quality coordination. To address this, we approached five subject matter experts 
(SMEs; three high ranking police officers, one ex-military, and one chief fire officer) who 
highlighted six ‘critical issues’ during this scenario that, according to their expertise and 
experience, required a high frequency of interagency liaison (Table 2). These SMEs were 
external  to  the  exercise  and  were  approached post-exercise  (via email).  They  were 
provided with a timeline and information feeds from the exercise in slow time and were 
asked to identify the ‘critical issues’, where interagency communication was required for
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Table 1. Frequency of communications between (and within) agencies 
 
 Police 1 Police 2 Police 3 Amb Fire Media Military Trans STAC LA Govt Off Health Utilities Environ Gold Control Ex Total 
Fire 8 5 5 7 86 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 5 21 10 167 
Trans 10 7 6 3 4 5 9 54 2 2 2 2 16 2 1 10 23 158 
Health 7 4 5 9 2 3 2 2 9 6 3 40 6 2 17 14 22 153 
Police 1 73 5 5 5 6 6 1 7 1 5 1 1 3 1 6 4 20 150 
LA 12 6 6 4 4 6 4 4 4 53 6 6 7 5 2 7 6 142 
Amb 8 6 6 91 1 0 2 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 3 8 134 
Utilities 7 2 2 1 2 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 63 1 6 4 7 107 
Environ 6 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 2 1 0 0 4 26 2 5 27 79 
Govt Off 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 3 8 2 1 3 1 2 8 24 71 
Media 8 3 3 3 4 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 1 3 0 46 
Police 3 5 3 14 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 6 40 
Police 2 4 20 5 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 38 
STAC 2 2 2 2 5 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 4 35 
Military 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 32 
Gold 6 5 3 4 5 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 31 
Total 160 69 63 131 124 29 55 99 30 86 21 59 111 45 15 85 165 1347 
 
Note. Amb, ambulance service; Trans, transport; STAC, science and technical advice cell; LA, local authority; Govt off, government office; Util, utilities; Environ, 
environment agency; Gold, gold group; Cont, control; Ext, external.
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Figure 2. The interaction between communication content and audience on communication frequency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. MA network during the response phase of incident management. 
 
 
success (or ‘good’ decision-making). An issue was highlighted as ‘critical’ if four of the five 
SMEs identified  and agreed that it was. SMEs also identified  which  agencies  should be 
involved; only five of 14 agencies were  identified as requiring  involvement  with these 
critical issues (police, fire and rescue, ambulance, military, and local authority) which the 
authors suspect is due to their need to be involved in the dynamic response  phase of the 
incident. Each ‘critical issue’ was also coded for the prevalence  of our three barriers: (1) 
non-time-bounded problem,  (2) large number  of agencies  involved, (3) and/or  lacked
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Table 2. The six critical issues identified by the subject matter experts 
 
Critical issue 
(agencies involved)                             Definition                                           Optimal response
 
Resource 
coordination 
(police, fire, 
ambulance, local 
authority, 
military) 
Casualty triage 
(police, fire, 
ambulance) 
 
 
 
 
 
Communication 
channels (police, 
fire, ambulance, 
local authority) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reception centre 
location (police, 
local authority) 
 
 
 
Emergency 
evacuation 
(police, fire, 
ambulance, local 
authority) 
 
 
 
 
Handover of 
primacy (police, 
local authority) 
 
The timely resolution of any major 
incident requires agencies to 
continually monitor and implement 
intra-agency resources whilst sharing 
this information and receiving 
information from other agencies 
Participants had to consider how to 
coordinate the recovery of casualties 
and bodies during the response phase 
 
 
 
 
 
During the initial response phase, the 
communication (‘airwave’) channels 
were disrupted. The police received a 
direct request from a tactical officer on 
whether or not they should implement 
the ‘Mobile Telecommunication 
Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS)’ – 
A UK procedure for prioritizing mobile 
telephone networks for emergency 
services 
This is essential for ensuring the welfare 
of those civilians affected by the 
incident 
 
 
 
All agencies  received information that a 
smoke plume caused by the aeroplane 
crash might potentially be toxic and 
thus hazardous to responders and 
civilians in affected area 
 
 
 
 
At some point, the police must hand 
over the primary management of the 
incident to the local authority 
 
Sharing of resource information 
should occur continually, but it is 
especially important during the 
initial response phase 
 
 
A significant amount of coordination 
regarding the issue should occur at 
the tactical (bronze) level on scene. 
Strategic decisions and actions with 
regard to the distribution of 
resources by police, fire, and 
ambulance at ‘gold’ level is also 
required 
Collaboratively decide to invoke the 
scheme and provide interagency 
rationale for the decision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There needs to be ongoing review of 
the needs of civilians. This should be 
primarily led by the local authority 
as it feeds into the later recovery 
phase when attempting to restore 
normality 
There needs to be discussion 
amongst blue light responders and 
the local authority, with advice 
from science and technical advisors 
(STAC) or the airline investigation 
branch. A joint decision must then 
be made on whether or not to 
evacuate both responders and 
civilians from the affected areas 
This indicates that the response 
phase is over the recovery phase 
has begun. Thus, the timing of this 
decision is crucial
 
 
 
clear  strategic  direction.  Qualitative  analyses of communications about  these  critical 
issues  explored   how  ‘barriers’  and  interagency   discussions  interacted. Quantitative 
analyses of to whom these communications were made was also conducted to establish
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whether the response was ‘interoperable’.  It was classed as ‘interoperable’  if more than 
50% (i.e., the majority) of logged communications about this issue were ‘interagency’. 
 
 
Results 
Descriptive  analyses  of inter- and intra-agency communication frequency 
A repeated measures  ANOVA found that across the incident  as a whole  agencies made 
significantly more  intra-agency communications (M = 68.42,  SD = 41.52)  than  intera- 
gency communications (M = 33.00, SD = 20.13), F(1, 11) = 13.581, p = .004. There was 
a significant difference  in the number  of communications made depending upon  their 
content, F(2, 22) = 6.246, p = .007. Significantly more messages discussed information 
seeking  (M = 55.58,  SD = 35.82)  than  decisions  (M = 30.00,  SD = 22.68)  or  actions 
(M = 16.17, SD = 28.229). There was a significant interaction between communication 
content, audience,  and  frequency,  F(1.23,  13.58) = 6.871,  p = .016,  as information- 
seeking communications were especially intra-agency (Figure 2). 
 
 
Social network  analysis 
UNICET was used to calculate  ‘network  density’ and how  embedded or isolated each 
‘node’ (e.g., agency) was within  the wider  network  (Hanneman  & Riddle, 2005). The 
average density value was 3.45, which represented an average density tie of 59.5%. This 
meant that, across the entire incident,  59.5% of all possible reciprocal  communications 
between agencies occurred with an average number of messages between agency pairs of 
3.5 messages. This indicated  that 40.5% of possible communications between agencies 
were not made. Low density occurred because agencies focused on contacting individuals 
within their own organizations instead of the network  (Table 1). The highest number of 
interagency  communications (n = 16; transport and utilities) was less than a quarter  of 
the number  of intra-agency communications (n = 86; fire and rescue). Network  density 
was  significantly  higher  during  the  response  phase  of the  incident  (density  = 2.95) 
compared to the recovery phase (density  = 0.49), t(0.61)  = 2.61, p < .05, as 75.4% of all 
possible communications were  made during response  compared to only 27.1% during 
recovery (Table 3). This pattern  was also illustrated in the visual representations of the 
network, as the  response   phase  had  more  (strong)  ties  between pairs  of agencies 
(Figure 3) than the recovery phase (Figure 4). 
Centralization measures how well connected a node is with the rest of the network. In- 
degree centrality reflects the number of communications leading into that node, whereas 
out-degree  centrality reflects the number  of communications going out from that node 
(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). High in-degree centralization  indicates that a small number 
of agencies  are being  consulted by all others,  whereas  high out-degree  centralization 
indicates that a small group of agencies are sending information  out (Scott, 2001). The 
 
Table 3. Average density values and percentage of present ties across network for entire incident and 
per incident phase 
 
 Density Density:  % of ties 
Entire incident 3.45 59.5 
Response phase 2.95 75.4 
Recovery phase 0.49 27.1 
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Figure 4. MA network during the recovery phase of incident management. 
 
multiagency network  was found to be decentralized as there were relatively low levels of 
in- and out-degree centralization, although in-degree asymmetry was almost twice as high 
as out-degree  (28.5% and  15.7%, respectively,  see  Table 4). The  network  was  more 
centralized    during    the    initial    response     phase    (in-degree = 25.49%   and    out- 
degree  = 17.12%)    than     the     recovery     phase     (in-degree = 10.82%    and     out- 
degree  = 6.25%). Table 5 presents  each agency’s itemized centrality for both phases of 
the incident  and across the entire incident.  In addition, the SNA found no evidence of a 
hierarchy within the network at any phase of the incident or overall (Table 4). This meant 
that no single agency commanded the incident as a key player (albeit this finding would be 
expected as a product of the UK Gold Command structure). 
 
 
Interoperability during six ‘critical issues’ 
Critical issues were coded for the presence or absence of our three hypothesized ‘barriers’ 
to multiagency decision-making, namely whether the issue was ongoing in duration (e.g., 
lacked a deadline), involved three or more agencies, and/or lacked a clear superordinate 
goal (e.g., lacked strategic direction from gold; Table 6). Although there was no significant 
correlation  between the number  of barriers  present  and the frequency  of interagency 
communications, there  was an interesting  trend  in the  data. It was found  that  barrier 
frequency    was   negatively   correlated    to   interagency    communication   frequency 
(r =    .542, p = .266); as the number of barriers increased, communication with external 
agencies decreased.  Likewise, a nonsignificant  positive correlation  was found between 
 
Table 4. Hierarchy and centralization degrees for the entire incident and per incident phase 
 
 Hierarchy Centralization – In-degree (%) Centralization – Out-degree (%) 
Entire incident 0 28.57 15.78 
Response phase 0 25.49 17.12 
Recovery phase 0 10.82 6.25 
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 Incoming Outgoing  Incoming Outgoing  Incoming Outgoing 
Police 1 10.60 8.82  5.29 6.53  2.40 2.29 
Local Authority 5.73 8.29  1.79 6.88  1.60 1.47 
Police 2 4.60 2.24  2.86 2.12  0.67 0.12 
Police 3 4.20 2.35  3.00 1.82  0.67 0.53 
Fire 8.27 9.82  2.43 9.06  0.73 0.77 
Ambulance 8.73 7.88  2.50 7.88  0.06 0.06 
Transport 6.60 9.29  2.86 9.00  0.47 0.29 
Health 3.93 9.00  1.29 6.88  0.87 1.88 
Utilities 7.40 6.29  2.86 4.53  1.07 1.77 
Environment 3.00 4.65  1.29 2.82  0.53 1.71 
Government Office 1.40 4.18  1.29 3.82  0.13 0.41 
Military 3.67 1.88  1.93 1.77  0.33 0.12 
Science and Technical 2.00 2.06  1.86 2.00  0.07 0.06 
Media 1.93 2.71  1.71 2.59  0.20 0.12 
Gold Group (Strategic 3.40 1.82  3.21 1.71  0.40 0.12 
External 11.00 N/A  8.67 N/A  2.20 N/A 
Control 5.67 N/A  4.87 N/A  0.87 N/A 
 
 
Table 5. Itemized in-degree and out-degree centrality for each agency for the entire incident and per 
incident phase 
 
Entire incident                   Response                       Recovery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advice Cell 
 
 
Coordinating Group - SCG) 
 
 
 
 
barrier frequency and intra-agency communication (r = .691, p = .128); as the number of 
barriers  increased,  the  number  of within-agency  communication also increased.  This 
suggests that when decision-making is more complex  (e.g., increased  barriers), 
communication with other agencies decreases and internal-agency communication 
increases. It is possible that the lack of statistical significance in this trend was due to the 
lack of power generated  by our single (albeit large) naturalistic data set. Further research 
in more experimental and repeatable settings may help to clarify these effects. 
 
 
Qualitative  analyses of critical  issues characterized by  where the intra-agency  communications: 
Resource coordination and casualty triage 
Table 6 shows how the two ‘critical issues’ that had all three barriers present  were the 
only two critical issues were communications were predominantly intra-agency focussed 
(i.e., not intereoperable). Both ‘resource coordination’ and ‘casualty triage’ critical issues 
had ongoing duration  (e.g., lacked a deadline for a final decision and action), involved 
more than two agencies,  and, following analysis of the communications sent from the 
‘gold’ strategic  syndicate,  had  no  superordinate  goals.  The  only  reference   made  to 
‘resources’  in the  gold  syndicate  was  unclear:  ‘Police gold: Scene  management  and 
resourcing  at scene’, and communications on ‘casualty triage’ focused  on information 
seeking rather than setting necessary direction: ‘Fatalities. What is the scale of the incident 
we are dealing with?’; ‘Bodies left on scene at present? Those at hospital being dealt with’. 
Thus, both issues were considered by the SMEs to lack strategic direction. 
Analyses of communication content at the tactical level supported our earlier finding 
that  agencies  focused  on  intra-agency  matters  and  that  these  communications were
  Non-time- 
bounded (Y/N)? 
More than 
2 agencies (Y/N)? 
Poor strategic 
direction (Y/N)? 
Total number 
of barriers 
 
Intra-agency 
 
Interagency 
occur (% of interagency 
communications)? 
Resource 
coordination 
Casualty triage 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
Y 
 
Y 
3 
 
3 
34 
 
14 
8 
 
10 
No (19) 
 
No (42) 
Communication 
channel failure 
Reception centre 
N 
 
Y 
Y 
 
N 
Y 
 
N 
2 
 
1 
4 
 
9 
4 
 
13 
Yes (50) 
 
Yes (59) 
location 
Emergency 
 
N 
 
Y 
 
Y 
 
2 
 
8 
 
12 
 
Yes (60) 
Primacy handover Y N N 1 4 14 Yes (78) 
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Table 6. The number of barriers and frequency of communications for each critical issue 
 
Frequency of 
communications                   Did interoperability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
evacuation
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predominantly  concerned  with   information   seeking   (Figure 5).  For  example,   the 
ambulance  service focused on information  seeking about their own resources:  ‘How is 
ambulance  coping with core business? i.e. availability of resources?’; as did the fire and 
rescue service: ‘All bulk foam units are currently in use. What reserve stocks of foam do we 
have and do we need to order more?’ For the casualty triage issue, it was also found that 
agencies were primarily concerned with information about internal resources:  ‘Request 
information from ICR regarding our casualty figures from all sites’. Despite this, the SMEs 
recommended that communication between agencies should be interagency  focused to 
reach a successful resolution.  As was found, an intra-agency focus on internal resources 
reduced  the  ability of agencies  to coordinate  resources  on scene.  Likewise, agencies 
discussed  casualty  triage  by  gathering  information   from  one  another,   yet  failed  to 
coordinate their efforts on scene to facilitate action. Both issues were characterized by the 
three  identified  barriers,  and  both  issues induced  a failure to communicate between 
agencies and execute action. 
 
 
Qualitative analyses of critical issues characterized  by interagency communication: Communication 
channel failure, reception centre location, emergency evacuation, and primacy handover 
Discussions  about  the  ‘communication channel  failure’, ‘reception  centre  location’, 
‘emergency evacuation’, and ‘primacy handover’ were predominantly interagency (i.e., 
>50% of communications were  interagency)  and tended  to focus less on information 
seeking  and  more   on  action   execution  (Figure 5).  The  only  exception  was  the 
‘communication channel  failure’ issue (Table 6), as this issue was minimally discussed 
(n = 8) and only just reached the 50% interagency communication margin. In terms of the 
barriers that were present  for these issues, there were mixed findings. As mentioned, the 
frequency of interagency  communications was negatively, albeit non-significantly, 
associated  with the number  of barriers. It is likely that this non-significant trend  was in 
part due to the mixed findings when the number  of barriers dropped below 3. 
Both team size and duration of issue are barriers to interoperability that are difficult to 
influence   from  a  solutions   perspective.  As  such,   we   focused   on  the   setting   of 
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25 
Decision 
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10 
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Critical issue 
 
Figure 5. The frequency of communications made for each critical issue broken down by communi- 
cation content.
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superordinate goals from ‘gold’ decision-makers  for our analysis. Although gold 
acknowledged communication channel  failures as an issue that needed  to be resolved: 
‘Mobile  phone   network   may  not  be  working.  Not  sure  how  to  communicate to 
community’, they did not outline  a strategic goal. Likewise, the emergency  evacuation 
issue lacked clear strategic direction as commanders focused on information seeking over 
setting goals: ‘Need to have update  re smoke/direction and intensity  etc’. This lack of 
superordinate strategy further  impacted  tactical discussions  as responders focused  on 
reacting  to the  impact  of the  issue rather  than  generating  tactics  for resolution  or to 
prevent  further escalation or harm: ‘boroughs need to be mindful of the lack of 
communication methods  due to the loss of power’; ‘Contact AAIB for specialist advice 
regarding  hazards  contained  within  smoke  plume’.  Thus,  although  there  was a high 
proportion of interagency  communication, they did not induce  action. As indicated  in 
Figure 5, the content of communications for these two issues was fairly evenly dispersed 
between information  seeking,  decision-making,  and  action  execution. Although  they 
were not dominated by information seeking as was found for the two intra-agency issues, 
the  proportion of communications was  less focused  on  action  execution than  their 
interagency   counterpart issues  (e.g.,  reception centre  location,  primacy  handover). 
Fundamentally,  a lack of strategic  direction  diluted  the  focus of discussions  on action 
execution. 
In contrast,  the ‘reception  centre  location’ and ‘primacy handover’ issues did have 
clear strategic direction.  For the reception centre  location  issue, gold communicated a 
clear goal: ‘Agree to active humanitarian  centre’ and further  specified who should take 
charge: ‘LA [local authority]  to organise humanitarian  centre’. This meant that the local 
authority was able to take charge of the tactical response and coordinate action with other 
agencies:  ‘LA understands police  have been  posed  question  about  flowers  and  other 
tributes and are identifying suitable areas. Expect contact  soon on this’. This was similar 
for the  primacy  handover  issue: ‘LA have the  lead. Key messages,  major tragedy.  All 
agencies  have worked  together;  now  return  to normality’. Interestingly,  although  this 
message was not communicated until the very end of the response phase of the incident, 
the LA (in accordance with their role) had already begun contingency planning for taking 
primacy: ‘Recovery group meeting convened at 13.00. Rationale: To initiate process and 
an impact  assessment  in the  early stages and to horizon  scan for the  next  48 hours’. 
Communications predominantly focused  on  action  execution rather  than  redundant 
information seeking (Figure 5). Thus, issues that were guided by strategy from gold were 
dealt  with  through  increased  interagency  communications (as recommended by the 
SMEs) that specifically focused on the useful execution of actions. 
 
 
Discussion 
NDM can be used in a novel way to explore the intricate cognitive and social processes to 
understand failures to act. Data were  collected  from an immersive simulated  training 
exercise  of the emergency  response  to a major disaster. The network  as a whole  was 
decentralized and communications tended  to be intra-agency-focused and dominated  by 
information   seeking.  SMEs identified   six  critical  issues  that   required   interagency 
communication for a successful  resolution  (e.g., decisions  needed  to be coordinated 
jointly between agencies). If critical issues were non-time-bounded, involved more than 
two agencies, and lacked clear strategic direction,  then communications predominantly 
involved   redundant  intra-agency   information   seeking,   as  opposed  to   the   useful
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interagency  coordination of decisions and actions (as recommended by the SMEs). The 
decision-making process was delayed due to decision inertia. However, when one or more 
of these  barriers  was missing, interagency  communications increased  and discussions 
were more focused on decisions and actions. Specifically, when issues had clear strategic 
direction, they were associated with action execution. We argue that the relatively under 
explored  notion  of ‘decision inertia’ and the  contexts that  provoke  it warrant  further 
attention,  as it is a salient problem  in real-world decision-making.  Given the  repeated 
criticism of the emergency  services for failures to act rather than for errors of judgment, 
we suggest that specific attention  be directed  at this interesting  phenomenon of what 
Anderson (2003) more broadly describes as ‘The Psychology of Doing Nothing’. 
 
 
Limitations 
It is difficult to dispute  the academic integrity of the NDM movement  in extending our 
understanding of real-world choice, yet there is an inherent methodological problem  in 
deriving conclusions  from such uncontrolled, complex,  and dynamic contexts. By 
researching  ‘natural’ environments where  the researcher cannot  manipulate  rigorously 
defined   independent  variables,  nor   quantify   objective   dependent  outcomes,   the 
objectivity of research  conclusions  is reduced.  There is a risk that researchers’  interests 
could bias the interpretation of the data, creating the potential  for unreliable  or invalid 
findings  (Lipshitz et al.,  2001;  McAndrew  & Gore,  2013),  as researchers continually 
return  to and attempt  to explain  the data, thereby  risking post-hoc  rationalization  and 
assumed significance. Likewise, it is possible that the ability to immerse oneself in the data, 
with  the  freedom  for methodological flexibility, is a strength  for NDM research  that 
primarily desires pragmatic solutions derived from the data to help practitioners. 
It has been  suggested  that a useful way to improve  objectivity may be through  the 
use of simulations, whereby researchers can maintain a level of control over the scenario 
and data recordings  (Alison, van den Heuvel et al., 2013). Yet this may come at the cost 
of reduced  stress and cognitive demand on the decision-maker compared  to real life. The 
behaviour  of participants may also be influenced  by the simulated environment as, for 
example, participants focus more on information seeking over action implementation as 
this is perceived  as the main purpose of the communicator. Alternatively, the traditional 
laboratory-based decision-making environments may improve objectivity of conclusions, 
but this comes at the cost of artificially clean decision-making environments that assume 
pure rationality of thought  (Thwaites & Williams, 2006). It is noteworthy that research 
on  emergency   decision-making   is  notoriously   complex   and   might   involve  many 
variables,  such  as strategic  group-level  presentation (Van Leeuwen,  2007),  intricate 
power   relations  (Nadler  & Halabi,  2006),  perceived   dangerousness  of  emergencies 
(Fischer et al., 2011),  and a whole  spectrum of non-verbal  factors,  such  as the  body 
language  and  facial expression of decision-makers,  and  a number  of serious  ethical 
considerations would also arise (Binik, Mah, & Kiesler, 1999). Furthermore, we should 
bear in mind that  even  the  currently  available virtual reality systems offer only crude 
approximations of natural experiences and only half-credible computer-generated 
responses   (Rovira,  Swapp,   Spanlang,  &  Slater,  2009).   To  deal  with   (but   not   to 
completely  overcome)  this challenge, we adopted  a complementary qualitative method 
that could bring other  kinds of subtle  insights, which  are sometimes  out of scope  for 
experimental methods  (Bryman, 2007), to light. 
Thus, we suggest that rather than judge research according to how ecologically ‘valid’ 
or ‘objective’ it is, it should be judged according to the ‘credibility’ and ‘transferability’ of
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the conclusions drawn from the context-rich environment (Mischler, 1990). Kuhn (1962) 
highlights how the definition of ‘science’ is a culturally defined phenomenon according to 
the benchmarks set by the scientists of the day; thus, NDM may reflect a paradigm shift 
from  a top-down  experimental focus  to  a more  bottom-up  focus  on  contextualized 
enquiry. Overall, although we acknowledge that there are methodological concerns for 
NDM and simulation-based research,  we argue that the unique advantage of context and 
grounded  meaning to conclusions  is an unparalleled  advantage of this research domain. 
 
 
Three barriers to macrocognition in multiteam systems: Non-time-bounded choice, 
large team  size, and a lack of superordinate direction 
We found that when a decision task was non-time-bounded, involved multiple agencies, 
and lacked clear strategic direction, then interagency action execution failed and decision 
inertia occurred through  the redundant deliberation  of intra-agency information. 
Interestingly,  the  only two  issues where  the  majority of communications were  intra- 
agency  and focused  on information  seeking  were  also the  only two  issues that  were 
characterized by all three  decision barriers. It is acknowledged that whilst intra-agency 
resource  monitoring  is useful during a major incident  response  (National Police 
Improvement  Agency,  2009),  interagency   coordination  and  information   sharing  is 
equally critical, and further that communications on decisions and actions will inevitably 
be less than those on information seeking; as the latter informs the former. To minimize 
these  effects, we focussed  on the  six ‘critical issues’ that  SMEs identified  as requiring 
interagency  communication. 
The  effectiveness  of a multiteam  system  is dependent upon  the  sharing  of task 
interdependence across the team network  (De Dreu, 2007), and thus, an overt focus on 
intra-agency   information   can   distract   decision-makers   from   collective   goals  and 
behaviours  (Comfort, 2007; De Dreu, 2007). By solely communicating agency-specific 
information,  there  is the risk of an ‘information starvation’ effect within  the multiteam 
system, where  important information  is not  shared  with  the  wider  team,  a prevalent 
problem during emergency response (Netten, Bruinsma, van Someren, & de Hoog, 2006). 
Although a decentralized approach to multiteam systems may usefully allow experts  to 
focus on their  own  specialisms  (House  et al., 2014),  if this occurs  in the  absence  of 
interagency coordination of efforts, then this means that key decisions and actions may be 
missed or redundantly duplicated  (Brannick et al., 1992). Interagency communication is 
essential to facilitate a shared understanding of the requirements of the dynamic decision 
environment. 
One  barrier  that  we  predicted would  reduce  decisions  and  actions  was a lack of 
deadlines or specific time demands. Individuals avoid difficult choices when possible (van 
den Heuvel et al., 2012) and so when  critical issues were non-time-bounded, we found 
that teams failed to communicate interagency decisions and actions. We acknowledge, as 
with most NDM research,  that we cannot  conclude  a causal relationship  between time 
demands and decision outcomes,  but existing literature may help explain it. It is possible 
that  a lack of deadlines  induced  inaction  as teams tried to avoid potential  anticipated 
negative emotions,  such as anticipated regret  (Anderson,  2003). Individuals may have 
utilized more selective search strategies when  evaluating options  because they felt they 
had the time to do so. Indeed, when decision-makers are placed under time pressure, then 
they tend to use time-saving processes such as satisficing to reach a choice (Simon, 1956); 
yet  when   deadlines   are   absent,   individuals   use   more   selective   alternative-based 
processing  to continually  deliberate  on  potential  courses  of action  to find the  ‘best’
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option  (Parker  & Schrift, 2011).  We suggest  that  when  a critical issue was non-time- 
bounded,  teams redundantly  sought  further  information  about  the choice  from within 
their own agency, rather than committing  to a joint choice with other agencies. 
The involvement of more than two agencies also reduced communication on decisions 
and  actions.  It is possible  that  an  increase  in team  size reduced  the  ‘psychological 
ownership’ over decision outcomes  due to diluted feelings of responsibility and 
accountability  (Kroon et al., 1991; Pierce et al., 2001). Agencies must keep one another 
informed of their actions in multiteam systems to orchestrate the smooth sequencing of 
activity (Healey, Hodgkinson, & Teo, 2009), yet when responsibility is diluted, roles and 
responsibilities are confused  (Bearman et al., 2010). Role confusion can permeate both 
intra- and interagency  action to reduce the overall effectiveness of the multiagency team 
(Quarantelli,  1985).  An increase  in team  size may further  decrease  the  level of trust 
throughout the team network. Trust is reflected by a willingness of the trustor to take risks 
based upon advice received from the trustee  (Mayer et al., 1995) and within multiteam 
networks  the building of trust  is based upon  reciprocity  (Rusman et al., 2010). When 
team size was larger, agencies may have focused on information  concerning their own 
team due to poor trust within the wider multiteam network. Fundamentally, any increase 
in interagency  team size means that individuals can ‘hide in the crowd’ and avoid taking 
responsibility for action (Kroon et al., 1991). 
A further  barrier associated with reduced  interagency  action was when  there  was a 
lack of clear superordinate direction  (LePine et al., 2008). Interestingly,  not only was a 
lack of strategic  direction  associated  with intra-agency information  seeking, but when 
strategic direction was present, this appeared to increase interagency communications on 
‘actions’, suggesting a bidirectional relationship. In other words, a lack of strategy reduced 
action, whilst strategic direction  facilitated action. Unclear goals at a strategic level may 
have reduced  cooperation as decision-makers were distracted  by their own intra-agency 
goals (de Bruijn, 2006). Intra- and interagency  goals tend  to compete (Sonnenwald  & 
Pierce, 2000) and so if strategic goals are unclear, then intra-agency goals are more salient. 
It was found that when strategic goals were set, discussions became focused on facilitating 
action,  which  was  judged  by the  SMEs as necessary.  Effective communications are 
essential for facilitating action  in multiteam  systems where  different  backgrounds and 
cultures must work together towards an effective resolution (Bearman et al., 2010) and so 
strategic goals must be set with clear meaning and intent (Keyton & Beck, 2010). This is 
achieved by establishing reciprocal relationships  to develop a shared understanding and 
team cognition (Cooke, Gorman, & Rowe, 2009). Thus, when strategic direction is lacking 
either   completely   or  due   to  implicit   assumptions,  then   teamwork   failed  to  be 
interdependent and  goal-focused (Salas, Cook, & Rosen,  2008);  yet when  strategy  is 
clear, it can facilitate the implementation of action in multiteam networks. 
 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
Our research has both methodological and applied implications. Firstly, we demonstrated 
how  NDM can  be  used  to  research  failures to  make  decisions.  Whereas  traditional 
laboratory-based decision experiments treat the absence of choice as a null effect, NDM’s 
emphasis  on  context and  real-world  choice  allows  us  to  explore  the  dynamic  and 
interrelating   processing   associated  with  decision  inertia.  In  addition,  our  research 
provides a worked example of how NDM allows for both practitioners and academics can 
combine  training and research  to derive mutually beneficial conclusions.  Secondly, we 
found that the barriers of non-time-bounded choice, large team size, and a failure to set
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clear strategic  direction  can inhibit  multiteam  system  decision-making,  a finding that 
requires further investigation. For example, experts can adapt to time pressure efficiently 
using satisficing strategies (Klein, 2008), and so it would be interesting to explore whether 
experts  are more willing to take action despite the absence of deadlines or whether they 
will continue  to avoid choice if the opportunity arises. It may also be possible to conduct 
cognitive  task analysis (CTA) style interviews  in order  to unpack  how  these  variables 
influence  the  cognitive  processing  of emergency  workers  in real life (Crandall et al., 
2006) or to compare differences in decision-making styles between ‘critical’ decisions and 
those that are less ‘high-stake’. As strategic goals facilitated interagency  communications 
of decisions  and actions,  this highlights  the  importance of superordinate goals during 
emergency  response  command  and  control,  creating  clear  implications  for effective 
training of practitioners. 
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